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The Federal Reserve System or the Fed is one of the most prestigious institutions in the world. Founded 
by the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, the Fed has the responsibility of setting the monetary policy of the 
U.S. The Fed’s actions affect the money supply in the U.S. market which has a direct influence on interest 
rates, growth and inflation. To better understand the role of the Fed we will first describe its structure 
and organization. We will then see who is really behind the central bank’s actions and who holds the reins 
of power inside the institution that plays the most important role in financial markets throughout the 
world. The monetary policy implemented by the Fed is closely monitored by major financial markets and 
institutions as it affects directly investments and security prices. We will explain clearly how the Fed 
conducts its monetary policy using three major tools to either decrease or increase money supply: open 
market operations, adjusting the discount rate and adjusting the reserve requirement ratio. We examine 
the main objectives of the Fed’s monetary policies and how those objectives maintain a “conflict of 
interest” relationship. A special interest we devote to a possible negative role that monetary policy may 
play in fuelling excessive asset price booms and we ask whether monetary policy should contradict the 
growth of asset price bubbles. Finally we examine the policies of the former chairman of the Fed Alan 
Greenspan (1987-2006) which contributed to the current crisis. We also assess the reaction to the crisis of 
the monetary policy of Ben Bernanke. 
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I - The Fed – its’ organization, structure and power  
 
The Federal Reserve System, essentially the central bank of the United States and 
otherwise known as ‘the Fed’, was “…founded in 1913 to provide the nation with a safer, 
more flexible, and more stable monetary and financial system; over the years its role in 
banking and the economy has expanded.”
1  The Fed has four principle aims: 
 
1.  “Conducting the nation’s monetary policy by influencing the money and credit 
conditions in the economy in pursuit of full employment and stable prices. 
2.  Supervising and regulating banking institutions to ensure the safety and soundness 
of the nation’s banking and financial system and to protect the credit rights of consumers. 
3.  Maintaining the stability of the financial system and containing systemic risk that 
may arise in financial markets. 
4.  Providing certain financial services to the U.S. government, to the public, to 
financial institutions, and to foreign official institutions, including playing a major role in 
operating the nation’s payments system.”
2 
 
Despite its creation in 1913, the Federal Reserve System did not solidify until 1935 (in 
the midst of the Great Depression), with the passing of the Banking Act that expanded the 
Fed’s powers.  The Federal Reserve System consists of twelve regions, each containing 
their own Federal Reserve Bank. A Board of Governors based in Washington D.C. 
manages the entire system, with each member serving a term of fourteen years.  By 
appointment of the President and confirmation of Congress, the Federal Reserve 
Chairman is in charge of Fed operations.
3  Most importantly, the U.S. Congress considers 
the central bank independent of the federal government, in that its decisions do not need 
legislative ratification.  However, since Congress created the Federal Reserve, it could 
                                                 
1 “The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions.”  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pf.htm p. 6 
2 “The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions.” p. 6 
3 “The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions.” p. 6  
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theoretically eliminate it, and the appointment of the Chairman requires confirmation 
from Congress, guaranteeing the government some level of influence. 
 
The Federal Reserve System has three primary tools to influence economics; the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC), headed by the Chairman, is delegated to decide how 
and when these tools are implemented.  The first tool of the Fed is the process of “open 
market operations”—or the buying and selling of United States securities (such as bonds) 
to influence the money supply and interest rates. The second tool is the power to set the 
required reserve ratio of commercial banking institutions, or the amount of liquid cash 
that banks must hold in relation to the amount of outstanding deposits.  As its third tool, 
the Fed sets the discount rate, the interest rate at which these commercial banking 
institutions borrow money from regional Federal Banks in order to preserve the specific 
reserve ratio required by the Federal Reserve.
4   
 
These tools allow the Fed to influence a great deal of operations.  The amount of reserves 
that a bank is required to hold directly affects the amount of money that a bank can loan 
out.  By lowering the discount rate, banks will be inspired to borrow from the 
government because they will have a relatively smaller burden in repaying the Federal 
Bank.  If a commercial bank has more funds, it is then more likely to give out loans to 
prospective homebuyers or small business owners, thus spurring investment, 
consumption, and production. An increase in overall interest rates will slow down both 
individual consumption and borrowing—people will be more likely to save money for 
their children’s education or other future investments, and businesses will be less likely to 






                                                 






To understand the structure of the Federal Reserve System, we need to understand first 
the characteristics of the U.S. politics at the time of its establishment in 1913. In fact why 
does one of the most prestigious institutions in the world have one of the most unusual 
structures? 
 
The U.S. constitution in its checks and balances and its preservation of states rights 
mirrors clearly the fear of the founding fathers and the U.S. people at that time from a 
centralized power. And it was this fear of centralized power that was behind the hostility 
of Americans towards the establishment of a prominent symbol of centralization such as 
a central bank. In 1791 the first Bank of the United States was created to supervise the 
well-functioning of the banking system and to sustain a stable economy. It was 
terminated in 1811 because of the non-renewal of its charter by the congress. In 1816 the 
second Bank of the United States was established. It was also terminated in 1836 by a 
veto of President Andrew Jackson.
5 During the late 1800’s and early 1900’s many severe 
bank panics occurred in the American financial markets. This culminated in the 1907 
panic which was a harsh crisis where many banks went bankrupt across the whole 
country. Accordingly, in 1913 the Federal Reserve Act was passed, creating the Federal 
Reserve System. It also defined 12 districts across the U.S. and a city in each district 
where a Federal Reserve district bank was to be founded.   
 
 
                                                 





Formal Structure of the Fed 
a- Federal Reserve District Banks 
 
Deciding to create 12 district banks across the U.S. the American congress was clearly 
aiming to create a decentralized system making sure that all regions in the country were 
represented and participating in monetary policy issues. The 12 Federal Reserve districts 





Figure 1: The twelve Federal Reserve District Banks6 
 
 
                                                 
6 Source: www.dallasfed.org/fed.district.html  
5 
 
The three largest Federal Reserve District Banks in terms of assets are those of New 
York, Chicago and San Francisco.
7 Out of these three, it is the New York district bank 
that is the most important with nearly 25% of the assets of the Fed because many large 
banks are located in this district
8. Each Federal Reserve Bank is privately and publicly 
owned at the same time. Commercial Banks of the district that become members of the 
Fed are required to purchase stock in their Federal Reserve District Bank. Those stocks 
are not traded in the secondary market and pay a maximum dividend of 6% annually as 
stated by the law. Each Fed district bank has nine directors. Member banks in each 
district elect six directors and the three others are appointed by the Board of Governors
9. 
All nine directors appoint the president of their district bank; but the decision should be 
approved by the Board of Governors. The choice of the nine directors should reflect all 
categories of the American economy and public. In fact, of those nine directors, three are 
professional bankers, three others are businesspeople from all sectors of the economy
10, 
and the final three represent the public interest.
11 
 
Functions of the 12 Federal Reserve Banks include the following
12: 
 
•  Check clearance 
•  Issuance of currency 
•  Withdrawal of damaged currency 
•  Evaluation of Bank mergers and expansion of activities 
•  Making discount loans to banks in their district 
•  Examination of bank holdings companies 
•  Data collection on economic and business conditions 
•  Research on Monetary policy 
 
                                                 
7 Together they hold 50% of the assets of the FED (Discount loans, securities and other holdings) 
8 Mishkin,F., Eakins,S., “Financial Markets & Institutions”, 5
th edition, Pearson (2006), p155 
9 Note that some directors are elected but others are appointed. 
10 Note that sectors of the economy include industry, labour, agriculture and consumers. 
11 Note that those directors are not allowed to be employees or stockholders of banks. If they chose to do 
so, they need to resign. 
12 Mishkin,F., Eakins,S., “Financial Markets & Institutions”, 5








•  They establish the discount rates which are reviewed and determined by the Board 
of Governors 
•  They decide over discount loans to member or non-member banks 
•  They select one commercial banker from each bank’s district to serve on the 
Federal Advisory Council. 
•  Five of the 12 bank presidents have a vote in the Federal Open Market 
Committee.(The president of the New York bank always has a vote in the FOMC; 
and the other four votes rotate annually among the remaining 11 presidents). 
 
b- Member Banks 
 
The national banks that are chartered by the Comptroller of the currency are required to 
be members of the Fed, but other banks that are chartered by their respective states are 
not. Before 1980 only member banks were required to keep deposits at the Federal 
Reserve Bank on which no interests were paid. So it was costly to be member of the Fed 
especially when interest rates rise. The direct effect of this was that more and more banks 
left the Fed. Today 35% of all banks are members whereas in 1947 50% were. This 
decline in Fed membership narrowed the Fed’s control over the money supply and it was 
harder for it to carry out its monetary policy effectively. In 1980, after pressure from the 
Board of Governors on the congress, the Depository Institutions Deregulation and 
Monetary Control Act of 1980 were voted on. This Act stated that by 1987 all depository 
institutions are required to keep reserves as deposits at the Fed. Members and non-
member banks had from 1987 reserve requirements towards the Fed and were now equal 
on this point. 
                                                 
13 Mishkin,F., Eakins,S., “Financial Markets & Institutions”, 5





c- Board of Governors 
 
The Board of Governors or the Federal Reserve Board is based in Washington D.C. It is 
made up by seven members appointed by the president of the United States. They serve a 
non-renewable term of 14 years
14. The intention behind this long-standing term is to limit 
political pressure on the governors so that they can build up monetary policies that will 
benefit the U.S. over the long-term. The terms are spread out so that one term expires 
every even-numbered year. For better representation of the American people and regions, 
governors should come from different Federal Reserve Districts. One of the seven board 
governors is selected by the U.S. president to be Chairman of the Federal Reserve; he 
serves a 4-year term which can be renewed.
15 The board has two main duties: 
 
1.  Regulation of commercial banks 
2.  Controlling of the Monetary Policy 
 
The first duty of the Board of Governors which is the regulation of commercial banks 
involves banks that are members of the Fed and bank holdings companies. It also 
supervises the action of the 12 Federal Reserve District banks which offer services to 
depository institutions and commercial banks in their district. In addition to that the board 
is responsible for the setting of margin requirements which is the “minimum amount of 




The second duty of the Board of Governors is the conduct of Monetary Policy. In fact the 
board has the power to revise reserve requirements imposed on depository institutions. It 
also controls the Discount rate by authorizing or not the changes in this rate set by the 
                                                 
14 Note that a governor can resign before the expiry of his term and be reappointed by the president. An 
example of this is governor McChesney who served for 28 years.  
15 Paul Volcker served as chairman from 1979 to 1987. Alan Greenspan served from 1987 to 2006. 
16 Downes J, Jordan, E, “Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms”, Barron’s, 6
th edition, (2003)  
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Federal Reserve banks. This process is known as “review and determination” process.
17. 
The seven members of the Board of Governors are also members of the Federal Open 
Market Committee (FOMC) and have equal votes. The FOMC consists of 12 members. 
Thus the board has the majority of the votes in this committee; and by that way controls 
largely a third tool of monetary policy which is the money supply determined by open 
market operations. 
 
The Board of Governors plays also other minor roles. In fact the board has bank 
regulatory functions when approving mergers of banks and allowing new activities for 
bank holding companies. It also oversees the activities of foreign banks in the U.S. 
Moreover, the board has staff for conducting economic analysis and research. It also sets 
the salary of the U.S. president and all officers of Federal Reserve District banks and 
reviews each bank budget.  
 
Finally, the chairman of the board advises the U.S. president on economic policy. He also 
testifies in front of the congress and is the Fed spokesman to the media
18. The chairman 
or another governor can represent the U.S. on economic issues outside the country. 
d- Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) 
 
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
19 consists of 12 members: seven members 
of the board of governors and 5 presidents of district banks. The president of the New 
York district bank is a permanent member while the other four are determined among the 
11 remaining presidents on a rotating basis. The seven other presidents of district banks 
attend the FOMC meeting, participate in the discussions, but have no voting rights. The 
chairman of the board of governors is also the chairman of the FOMC. The committee 
usually meets 8 times a year (every six weeks) and carries out open market operations to 
                                                 
17 Mishkin,F., Eakins,S., “Financial Markets & Institutions”, 5
th edition, Pearson (2006), p157 
18 Note that the information release from the Fed, directly after the FOMC meeting, began in 1994 to show 
more transparency and openness by the Fed as it was a very “secret” institution before. 
19 The FOMC is often referred to as the “Fed” in the press.  
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control the money supply. The FOMC meeting takes place in Washington D.C. where the 
attendance consists of:  
 
•  The seven governors. 
•  The 12 reserve bank presidents. 
•  The secretary of the FOMC, the board’s director of the Research and Statistics 
Division and his deputy. 
•  The directors of the Monetary Affairs and International Finance Divisions. 
•  The Directors of Research at each reserve district bank. (Sit around the side of the 
rooms and do not speak by tradition) 
•  Other senior board and reserve bank officials. (Sit around the side of the rooms 
and do not speak by tradition) 
 
 
The FOMC meeting is divided into two major phases. The first phase is a presentation by 
the director of the Research and Statistics Division on the national economic forecast. He 
is then queried by the governors and reserve bank presidents. Then each bank president 
presents an overview of the economic situation in his district and the bank’s view on the 
national economy. The governors do the same, except for the chairman. 
 
The second phase deals extensively with monetary policy; where the board’s director of 
the Monetary Affairs Division summarizes different scenarios of monetary policy 
actions. He is then queried by the governors and reserve bank presidents. Then it is the 
chairman’s turn to give his view on the present situation of the economy and recommend 
a monetary policy action that should be applied. Now each FOMC member discusses his 
or her views on the proposed monetary policy. The discussion is summarized by the 
chairman who proposes a wording for the statement that is finally read by the FOMC 
secretary. The FOMC members vote.
20  
 
                                                 
20 Note that those votes may not be unanimous and are made public. The chairman’s vote is usually on the 
winning side.  
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The statement which contains the new decisions by the FOMC is then sent to the Trading 
Desk or the Open Market Desk at the New York Fed District bank. It is there that open 
market operations take place. After the FOMC meeting, new directives and directions of 
the monetary policy are directly announced to the public.  
e- Advisory Committees 
 
The Federal Advisory Council makes recommendations to the Fed about economic and 
banking issues. It is made up of members from the 12 Federal Reserve districts. They are 
elected each year by their respective board of directors of the district banks. Washington 
D.C. is the headquarters for the meeting that takes place 4 times a year. 
 
The Consumer Advisory Council consists of 30 members and discusses consumer issues.  
The Thrift Institutions Advisory Council consists of representatives of saving banks, 
savings and loan associations, and credit unions.  
 Informal Power Structure of the Federal Reserve System 
 
When the U.S. Congress voted in the legislation of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, it 
had considered a highly decentralized system designed to work as 12 separate, 
cooperating central banks. The Federal Reserve Act also enabled the Fed to control only 
one monetary policy tool which is the discount loans to member banks. At that time open 
market operations were not widely used and the percentage of reserve requirement was 
set by the law. 
 
Moreover, the discount tool was to be controlled by both the Board of Governors
21 and 
the 12 district banks. But the ability of the Board to review the discount rate gave it more 
power over the district banks. Today it is mainly the Fed that set this policy tool. 
 
                                                 
21 At that time the Board of Governors was known as Federal Reserve Board.  
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It is after the 1929 crash of Wall Street that legislation by the Congress began to give 
more centralized power to the Board of Governors. In fact the Banking Act of 1933 gave 
the FOMC the power to determine open market operations. The Banking Act of 1935 
gave the Board the majority of votes in the FOMC. We can see now that the Board of 
Governors has gained control over another monetary policy tool which is the open market 
operations. In addition to that the Banking Act of 1935 granted the board the authority to 
change reserve requirements; thus giving it the power to control the third monetary policy 
tool.  
 
The Board of Governors sets also the salary of the President of each Federal District 
Bank and reviews the budget of those district banks. This direct influence (controlling the 
purse strings) by the board over the 12 federal district banks is clearly shown when the 
Board suggests a name for the presidency of a federal district bank and this suggestion is 
usually taken into consideration by the directors of the bank; although they have the right 
to choose a president by themselves with only the approval of the Board.  
 
In addition to this, the “owners” of the Federal Reserve Bank which are the member 
banks have almost no power in the decision-making process of the Fed. Although they 
own stock in the Fed, they only get paid 6% dividend per year which is set by the law 
regardless of how much the Fed makes in profits. The Fed can also use those stocks in 
which way it finds it useful without the consent of the member banks. Of course this is 
not the case in private corporations where shareholders own stocks in the company. Not 
to mention that from the six directors (A and B categories) that are supposed to be elected 
by member banks, only one represents them truly. And even this only director is often 
suggested by the Fed. The three Advisory Councils, as their names imply, have no 
authority at all over the Federal Reserve decision-making process.  
 
Finally, we can clearly see that the Federal Reserve System as it evolved can be 
considered as a powerful Central Bank, headquartered in Washington D.C. with branches 
in 12 American cities. Inside the Fed, it is the Board of Governors that controls nearly 
everything. It is the Chairman of the Board that exercises major controls over this body,  
12 
 
although this is not stated by the law. In fact, it is the chairman that is the spokesman of 
the Fed in front of the Congress; and it is him who negotiates with the President of the 
United States about economical issues. He also has the authority to set the agenda of the 
Board and the FOMC meetings, gaining control of what is going to be discussed in this 
meeting. And during those meetings, it is him who speaks first about monetary policy; 
thus gaining more influence on the decision-making process. He also supervises the team 
of economists and advisers that are in the board staff. The following figure (Figure 2) 
shows the formal structure of the Fed with its different components and the distribution 
of monetary policy responsibilities. 
 
 
Figure 2: Formal Structure and Allocation of Policy Tools in the Fed22 
                                                 
22 Mishkin,F., Eakins,S., “Financial Markets & Institutions”, 5
th edition, Pearson (2006), p153  
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The above Figure 2 can be drawn in a different way to better illustrate the power structure 
of the Fed that is centralized in the person of the chairman. Of course this structure is an 
informal one that does not reflect what is written in black and white in the Federal 











II - Monetary Policy  
 
Monetary Policy Tools 
 
The three main monetary policy tools are the following:  
 
•  Open Market Operation 
•  Adjustments in the discount rate 
•  Reserve Requirement 
 
a- Open Market Operation 
 
Open market operation is “the Fed’s purchase or sale of bonds in the open market”
23. 
When the FOMC meets eight times a year, it determines the target money supply level 
according to the present economic situation and future forecasts. This target money 
supply level is specified in the form of a range between a minimum desired limit and a 
maximum desired limit over the next coming months; rather than one definite target.  
(Ex: 3 %< money supply growth<5 %). Then the FOMC’s decisions on the target money 
supply level are sent to the trading desk at the New York Federal Reserve District Bank 
through a statement called the “policy directive”
24. It is this trading desk that carries out 
the selling or buying of government securities. Even though it receives policy directives 
eight times a year from the FOMC, the trading desk constantly uses open market 
operations in order to keep the money supply level within the specified target range. 
When the Fed purchases securities through government securities dealers, “the account 
balances of the dealers are credited with this amount”
25. Thus the total amount of funds at 
the dealer’s banks increases by the dollar amount of securities purchased by the Fed. This 
will permit an increase in the money supply. Note that this could not happen if a 
particular investor would have purchased those government securities because the Fed’s 
                                                 
23 Mishkin,F., Eakins,S., “Financial Markets & Institutions”, 5
th edition, Pearson (2006), p177 
24 Madura J, “Financial Markets & Institutions”; 6
th Edition, South-Western Publishing (2000),p80 
25 Madura J, “Financial Markets & Institutions”; 6
th Edition, South-Western Publishing (2000).p80  
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purchase results in the creation of new additional funds outside the circle of banks 
deposits, giving banks the ability to make new loans and create new deposits. An investor 
purchase would have only resulted in a change of account balances among commercial 
banks themselves. Finally, an open market purchase leads to an increase of deposits in 
commercial banks accounts and hence to a growth of the money supply or the monetary 
base. On the contrary, an open market sale leads to a reduction of deposits and reserves in 
commercial banks accounts and hence a decline in the money supply. But how could this 
control of money supply affect interest rates in the market and by that way the economy 
in general? 
b - Adjustments in the discount rate  
The Federal Reserve System implements monetary policy largely by targeting the federal 
funds rate. This is the rate that banks charge each other for overnight loans of federal 
funds, which are the reserves held by banks at the Fed. This rate is actually determined by 
the market and is not explicitly mandated by the Fed. The Fed therefore tries to align the 
effective federal funds rate with the targeted rate by adding or subtracting from the 
money supply through open market operations. The Federal Reserve System also directly 
sets the "discount rate", which is the interest rate for "discount window lending", 
overnight loans that member banks borrow directly from the Fed. This rate is generally 
set at a rate close to 100 points above the target federal funds rate. The idea is to 
encourage banks to seek alternative funding before using the "discount rate" option.
 26  
The equivalent operation by the European Central Bank is referred to as the "marginal 
lending facility." 
27 
Both of these rates influence the prime rate which is usually about 3 percentage points 
higher than the federal funds rate. Lower interest rates stimulate economic activity by 
lowering the cost of borrowing, making it easier for consumers and businesses to buy and 
build, but at the cost of promoting the expansion of the money supply and thus greater 
                                                 
26 Federal Reserve Bank San Francisco( 2004) 
27 Patricia S. Pollard, February 2003). "A Look inside Two Central Banks: The European Central Bank and 




inflation. Higher interest rates may slow the economy by increasing the cost of 
borrowing. The Federal Reserve System usually adjusts the federal funds rate by 0.25% 
or 0.50% at a time. 
The Federal Reserve System might also attempt to use open market operations to change 
long-term interest rates, but its "buying power" on the market is significantly smaller than 
that of private institutions. The Fed can also attempt to "jawbone" the markets into 
moving towards the Fed's desired rates, but this is not always effective.
  
c- Reserve Requirements 
Reserve requirements have long been a part of U.S. banking history. Depository 
institutions maintain a fraction of certain liabilities in reserve in specified assets. The 
Federal Reserve can adjust reserve requirements by changing required reserve ratios, the 
liabilities to which the ratios apply, or both. Changes in reserve requirements can have 
profound effects on the money stock and on the cost to banks of extending credit and are 
also costly to administer; therefore, reserve requirements are not adjusted frequently. 
Nonetheless, reserve requirements play a useful role in the conduct of open market 
operations by helping to ensure a predictable demand for Federal Reserve balances and 
thus enhancing the Federal Reserve’s control over the federal funds rate.  
 
Requiring depository institutions to hold a certain fraction of their deposits in reserve, 
either as cash in their vaults or as non-interest-bearing balances at the Federal Reserve 
does impose a cost on the private sector. The cost is equal to the amount of foregone 
interest on these funds—or at least on the portion of these funds that depository 
institutions hold only because of legal requirements and not to meet their customers’ 
needs.  
 
The burden of reserve requirements is structured to bear generally less heavily on smaller 
institutions. At every depository institution, a certain amount of reserve liabilities is 
exempt from reserve requirements, and a relatively low required reserve ratio is applied 
to reserve liabilities up to a specific level. The amounts of reserve liabilities exempt from  
17 
 
reserve requirements and subject to the low required reserve ratio are adjusted annually to 
reflect growth in the banking system.  
 
Changes in reserve requirements can affect the money stock, by altering the volume of 
deposits that can be supported by a given level of reserves, and bank funding costs. 
Unless it is accompanied by an increase in the supply of Federal Reserve balances, an 
increase in reserve requirements (through an increase in the required reserve ratio, for 
example) reduces excess reserves, induces a contraction in bank credit and deposit levels, 
and raises interest rates. It also pushes up bank funding costs by increasing the amount of 
non-interest-bearing assets that must be held in reserve. Conversely, a decrease in reserve 
requirements, unless accompanied by a reduction in Federal Reserve balances, initially 
leaves depository institutions with excess reserves, which can encourage an expansion of 
bank credit and deposit levels and reduce interest rates.  
d- Comparison of the Monetary Policy tools 
 
If we want to make a comparison of the three monetary policy tools that the Fed uses, we 
can say that the Fed uses mostly open market operations. In fact open market operations 
can be used without divulgating the Fed’s intentions. By that way they can be used 
continuously over time. Also the Fed has full control over the volume of the operations, 
which explains their flexibility and preciseness. They are also very easily reversed and 
can be implemented quickly (No administrative delays). Moreover, the discount rate will 
affect money supply only if banks respond to it; and loans from the discount window are 
usually for short term; thus the adjustment made by using the discount rate tool is 
temporary. The discount window is also the tool by which the Fed play its role of lender 
of last resort; which explains why the Fed is very careful when using this tool and does 
not use it frequently. It also embarrasses banks in their loanable funds policy decision-
making. The power of the Federal Reserve sets the required reserve ratio of commercial 
banking institutions, or the amount of liquid cash that banks must hold in relation to the 




Goals of Monetary Policy 
 
The tools of Monetary Policy that we discussed above have six economic goals:  
 
1.  High Employment 
2.  Economic Growth 
3.  Price Stability 
4.  Interest-rate Stability 
5.  Stability of Financial Markets 
6.  Stability of Foreign Exchange Markets 
 
 
We take a brief look at only two of those goals which are high employment and price 
stability. If the economy is weak and the unemployment rate is high, the Fed may desire 
to increase the level of spending and investments to boost the economy (See Figure 4). 
As discussed in part A of section II; it would do so by purchasing treasury securities 
using open market operations which result in the increase in the money supply and a 
decrease in the level of interest. By that way, an increase in money supply of loan able 
funds with low interest rates will cause an increase in business investments and spending. 
This will result in offer for jobs thus yielding a high employment rate. 
 
Figure 4: Monetary policy affecting aggregate spending28 
If the economy suffers from excessive inflation
29, the Fed may want to reduce aggregate 
spending by selling treasury securities using open market operations causing a downward 
shift in the money supply and an increase in the level of interest rates. By that way, 
scarce money and higher interest rates will increase the cost of financing new business 
                                                 
28 Madura J, “Financial Markets & Institutions”; 6
th Edition, South-Western Publishing (2000), p98 
29 Inflation is “the rise in price of goods and services, as happens when spending increases relative to 
supply of goods on the market”; Downes J, Jordan, E, Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms, 
Barron’s, 6
th edition (2003).  
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projects and thus decrease the level of investments and consumer spending and attenuate 
inflationary pressure (See Figure 5). 
 
 
Figure 5: Monetary Policy affecting Inflationary Pressure30 
Ideally the Fed would like to maintain a low inflation rate with a low unemployment rate. 
But given that a simulative monetary policy reduces unemployment rate and restrictive 
monetary policy reduces inflation, both rates maintain a negative correlation as they 
move in opposite ways. This is the reason why the Fed may not be able to adjust both 
rates together
31. This negative correlation is known as the “Phillips Curve”
32 and is 
shown in the following Graph 1.  
 
Graph 1: Negative Relationship between inflation and 
unemployment rates33 
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32Madura J, “Financial Markets & Institutions”; 6
th Edition, South-Western Publishing (2000), p 102 
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th Edition, South-Western Publishing (2000), p103  
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But does low inflation always mean high unemployment? In the next section of this paper 
we are going to see how the former Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Fed, Alan 




Monetary Policy and Financial Stability  
 
Price stability (low inflation) and to a degree high employment or economic growth are 
fairly uncontroversial goals of monetary policy. It is not so easy when it comes to 
financial stability (stability of financial markets and institutions). Before we discuss 
whether a central bank should include financial stability among its monetary policy goals 
we will consider reasons for a financial crisis, in particular we will check whether a 
monetary policy itself can be conducive to financial distress.  
 
The substance of any financial crisis is an immense and rapid decline in the value of a 
category of assets.  Such an explanation, however trivial, is in contradiction to the 
efficient market hypothesis. It is not the purpose of this paper to discredit the hypothesis; 
it is clear that in spite of its formal elegance it proved to be misleading in the perception 
of the functioning of financial markets. This is a matter of fact. However, an explanation 
why markets are not efficient and “irrational exuberance” or “speculative manias” happen 
is not so trivial any more. This is, first of all, subject to the behavioral theory of finance. 
Leaving apart academic theories let’s take here for granted that investors not necessarily 
make rational decisions and that markets are not always, if ever, effective. Asset price 
bubbles are a phenomenon difficult to deny. Instead of analyzing in what regard human 
beings are not perfectly rational let’s try to identify factors that lead to a build-up of 
financial imbalances.  
 
Firstly, it is useful to notice that speculative manias took place under the gold standard, 
too; consider the “tulip mania” in Holland in the 17th century or the collapse of the East 
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India Company in England. It proves that an active interest rate policy of a modern 
central bank is not a necessary condition for a crisis. However, it does not say that 
monetary policy can’t be a sufficient factor to bring about financial distress.  
 
Secondly, the risk of a financial crisis can be diminished by proper regulation of the 
financial market. Generally, the need for regulatory restrictions is not questioned. 
However, regulation restraining some activities creates incentives to look for loopholes. 
A good example is given by Engdahl
35 “The original intent of the Basle Accord was to 
force banks to reduce lending risk. The actual effect for US banks was just the opposite. 
They soon discovered a gaping loophole – off-balance-sheet transactions, notably 
derivation positions and securitization.” As an effect of securitization “the lending bank 
now no longer had to worry if the loan would ever be repaid.” 
 
Regulation not only creates incentives for financial institutions to look for loopholes but 
it also makes regulators wonder about the trade-off between making markets safer or 
making them more effective and credit less expensive. A devoted advocate of financial 
liberalization was Greenspan as the governor of the Fed. In particular, Greenspan’s 
opinion presented in 1987 to the US House of Representatives Committee on Banking 
clearly shows what was his choice concerning the trade-off: “…repeal of Glass-Steagall 
would provide significant public benefits consistent with a manageable increase in 
risk”.
36 Greenspan repeated this mantra until final repeal of the act in 1999.  
 
 
The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was intended, broadly speaking, to restrict commercial 
banks from speculative investing in risky assets and from resulting conflicts of interest 
which lay behind the crash of 1929. Another example of liberalization of the financial 
market in the US is the decision by the Fed in 1974 to lower to 50% the margin 
requirements for the purchase of stocks on credit (Regulation T) - the requirement had 
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been at 100% since 1934. Even in the face of the dot.com bubble Greenspan repeatedly 
refused to change the stock margin requirements, although “influential observers, 
including financier George Soros and Stanley Fisher, deputy director at the IMF, 
advocated that the FED let the air out of the credit boom by raising margin 
requirements”.
37 These remarks, far from an extensive discussion of financial regulation 
and liberalization, only illustrate the role which proper regulation plays in restricting a 
conflict of interest, excessive accumulation of risks and immoderate credit supply. 
Without doubt, were good regulation in place, any financial crisis would be less probable 
or less severe.  
 
Moreover, proper regulation must be accompanied by effective supervision. It was 
clearly missing in the case of the huge sale of non-delivery forward currency contracts by 
Russian banks before the Russian crisis in 1998 or in the case of the Madoff affair when 
the Securities and Exchange Commission did not undertake necessary activities. It is true 
that financial markets become more and more complicated and difficult to control 
(especially when loosely regulated). This observation may result in defeatist attitudes. 
Greenspan said: “It is, thus, all the more important to recognize that twenty-first century 
financial regulation is going to increasingly have to rely on private counterparty 
surveillance to achieve safety and soundness. There is no credible way to envision most 
government financial regulation being other than oversight of the process. As the 
complexity of financial intermediation on a worldwide scale continues to increase, the 
conventional regulatory examination process will become obsolete – at least for the more 
complex banking systems.”
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For the time being let’s accept two broad statements. Firstly, market participants are 
sometimes prone to speculative manias which lead to build-up of asset price bubbles. 
Secondly, proper regulation and supervision may reduce the risk and severity of a 
financial crisis. Given that, it is more important whether there are any economic, in 
particular monetary, conditions which would be favourable to financial imbalances. 
 
The financial crisis is triggered by a factor or an event that Minsky called a displacement. 
A displacement occurs when investors get excited about something—an invention, such 
as railroads or the internet, or a war, or a major change of economic policy. It also might 
be a change in the way the financial market operates; an invention of new financial 
instruments or changes in the regulatory framework.  
 
Minsky
39 points out that “the relations upon which the monetary authorities base their 
operations are predicted upon the assumption that a given set of institutions and usages 
exist. If the operations of the authorities have side effects in that they induce changes in 
financial institutions and usages, then the relations shift. As a result, the side effects of 
monetary operation can be quite different from those desired”.  
 
In fact, Minsky
40 not only points out at a spectacular event being a displacement but also 
at “prosperity” being a product of expansionary policy as a milieu where lending booms 
and speculation thrive. This is an important aspect of his financial instability hypothesis.  
“The first theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that the economy has 
financing regimes under which it is stable, and financing regimes in which it is unstable. 
The second theorem of the financial instability hypothesis is that over periods of 
prolonged prosperity, the economy transits from financial relations that make for a stable 
system to financial relations that make for an unstable system.”  
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It seems that both factors – a displacement and prosperity – matter. In the case of the 
dot.com bubble, for example, it was the development of new technologies which made 
investors exited but it was also a time of “prosperity” – a long period of low interest rates 
and credit boom. 
 
These remarks are not very far from a statement that monetary policy may create 
conditions which are propitious to the development of financial imbalances. This idea is 
openly expressed by White
41  “(…) persistently easy monetary conditions can lead to the 
cumulative build-up over time of significant deviations from historical norms – whether 
in terms of debt levels, saving ratios, asset prices or other indicators of “imbalances” The 
historical record indicates that mean reversion is a common outcome, with associated 
negative implications for future aggregate demand.”  
 
The same idea is presented by Borio and Lowe
42 “(…) low and possibly falling inflation 
together with a high degree of  credibility of monetary policy would give little reason for 
the authorities to tighten policy if they respond only to clear signs of inflationary 
pressures. Paradoxically, (…) endogenous responses to credible monetary policy increase 
the probability that latent inflation pressures manifest themselves in the development of 
imbalances in the financial system, rather than immediate upward pressure on higher 
goods and services price inflation. Failure to respond to these imbalances, either using 
monetary policy or another policy instrument, may ultimately increase the risk of both 
financial instability and subsequently deflation.” It seems that the earlier mentioned “side 
effects of monetary operation” by Minsky have very much in common with “endogenous 
responses to credible monetary policy” by Borio and Lowe. 
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The suggestion by Borio and Lowe that monetary policy may be a reason for financial 
distress and that it should respond to imbalances even though goods and services prices 
remain stable is a good starting point to the next part of the paper, which presents this 
issue in more detail.  
 
Can the Fed’s monetary policy contradict asset price booms? 
 
The opinion that monetary policy should consider financial stability as a target 
independent from price stability and that failure to respond to financial imbalances may 
be a reason for a crisis is not generally accepted at all. In particular, it does not seem to 
have been shared by the Fed policymakers. A contradictory view that central banks 
should restrict from manipulating asset prices used to be called “Greenspan’s doctrine”.  
This is well expressed by Bernanke and Gertler
43 “In brief, it is that flexible inflation-
targeting provides an effective, unified framework for achieving both general 
macroeconomic stability and financial stability. Given a strong commitment to stabilizing 
expected inflation, it is neither necessary nor desirable for monetary policy to respond to 
changes in asset prices, except to the extent that they help to forecast inflationary or 
deflationary pressures.” Bernanke and Gertler
44 justify this opinion claiming that “a key 
advantage of the inflation-targeting framework is that it induces policymakers to 
automatically adjust interest rates in a stabilizing direction in the face of asset price 
instability or other financial disturbances. The logic is straightforward; since asset price 
increases stimulate aggregate demand and asset price declines reduce it, the strong focus 
of inflation targeters on stabilizing aggregate demand will result in “leaning against the 
wind” – raising interest rates as asset prices rise and reducing them when they fall.” This 
straightforward logic is, however, only a pure academic speculation which not 
necessarily - and not in fact - has much to do with the reality. It is not only against other 
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professional opinions – such as that by Borio and Lowe above – but it is first of all in a 
sharp contradiction to the experience of many cases of a financial distress, including the 
present crisis.  
 
Moreover, this false opinion is a corner-stone of a formal model presented by Bernanke 
and Gertler
45 which “scientifically” justifies no need to react in an independent manner to 
financial market imbalances. “Greenspan has (...) safely retired, written his memoirs and 
handed the control (and blame) of the mess to a young ex-Princeton professor, Ben 
Bernanke. As a Princeton graduate, I can only say I would never trust monetary policy 
for the world’s most powerful central bank in the hands of a Princeton economics 
professor. Keep them in their ivy-covered towers.”
46 
 
Another argument against activist policy targeted at financial stability is alleged 
impossibility to differentiate between a bubble and fundamentally sound growth of asset 
prices. Bernanke and Gertler argue that “because “fundamental discount rate” is not 
directly observable, it is in general impossible to know whether there is a non-
fundamental component in the current stock price.”
 47 
 
Similar opinion on the role of monetary policy to prevent asset bubbles and financial 
instability is presented by Bordo et al who write “that a monetary regime that produces 
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In these days such opinions seem to be without doubt negatively verified by the 
experience of the present crisis and the economic situation in the years and months 
preceding. However, this experience is not unique at all. Also recommendations for 
monetary policy to counter build-up of financial imbalances are not a recent idea. Borio 
and Lowe maintained that “in principle, safeguards in the financial sphere, in the form of 
prudential regulation and supervision, might be sufficient to prevent financial distress. In 
practice, however, they may be less than fully satisfactory. If the imbalances are large 
enough, the end-result could be a severe recession coupled with price deflation. While 
such imbalances can be difficult to identify ex ante, the results presented in this paper 
provide some evidence that useful measures can be developed. This suggests that, despite 
the difficulties involved, a monetary policy response to imbalances as they build up may 
be both possible and appropriate in some circumstances.”
 49 
 
Looking at the problem from a specific perspective also White
50 gives his support to 
monetary policy which reacts to symptoms of financial imbalances. White argues that 
price stabilization which tries to avoid periods of deflation (what is characteristic for 
definitions of price stability as a central bank’s target) sometimes may be too 
expansionary and it may lead to an asset price bubble. This may happen in a situation of 
“good deflation” when prices decrease as an effect of some positive supply shocks such 
as rapid growth of productivity or – as recently – globalization. However, it is interesting 
in this context to ask to what degree monetary policy should be more accommodative in 
case of “bad deflation” – one induced by a financial crisis and falling demand - without 
risking it may turn out to have been too easy.  
 
In spite of its clear commitment to price stability ECB
51 was in favor of a monetary 
policy reactive to financial imbalances. The reaction postulated should follow a strategy 
of leaning against the wind where “the central bank would adopt a somewhat tighter 
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policy stance in the face of an inflating asset market than it would otherwise allow if 
confronted with a similar macroeconomic outlook under more normal market conditions. 
In this way a central bank would, already at an earlier stage of market dynamics, err on 
the side of caution in trying to avoid feeding the bubble with an accommodative policy. It 
would thus tolerate a certain deviation from its price stability objective in the shorter term 
in exchange for enhanced prospects of preserving price and economic stability in the 
future.” ECB
52 Such policy should also help avoid too late reaction which would only 
“prick the bubble” and thus would trigger a crisis.  
III - Greenspan’s Legacy and Bernanke’s attitude to the crisis 
 
In 1998 unemployment in the U.S. reached a 24-year low, inflation hit an 11-year low 
and consumer confidence was the highest it had been in 30 years. In fact during the 18-
year mandate of Greenspan (1987-2006) at the head of the Fed, the U.S. benefited from 
low inflation and suffered only two recessions. Inflation had not exceeded 5% since 
1991.  
 
Greenspan has managed to keep inflation low despite the stock market crash of 1987, 
several international crisis in the 1990s, a three-year bear market after the burst of the 
Dotcom bubble in 2000 and a terrorist attack on the world trade centers in New York in 
September 2001. According to Martin Wolf
53, associate editor and chief economics 
commentator at the Financial Times, Greenspan “has become an almost legendary 
figure”. And that is because Greenspan succeeded in keeping inflation low when it had 
broken out all over the world. He also did so after succeeding the successful Paul Volcker 
who, before Greenspan, crushed inflation too.  
 
According to Martin Wolf other reasons also helped the Chairman of the Board of 
Governors in keeping inflation low with a stable growth: “The monetarist counter 
revolution, the pain caused by the inflationary excesses of the 1970s, globalization and 
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the weakening of trade union power”. Wolf also made a comparison between Greenspan 
and the “father of Macroeconomics” John Maynard Keynes and asserted that both trust 
their own judgment and that both believe in “discretionary policymaking” and in the 
“wisdom of managing the long run by  treating it as a series of short runs”. 
 
In the Jackson Hole 2005 symposium, Greenspan stated that his own approach to 
monetary policy was the following: “Maximum sustainable economic growth...with price 
stability pursued as necessary condition to promote that goal.”
54 In fact, to Martin Wolf, 
Greenspan’s focus on “maximum growth” along with his will to discover the “economy’s 
speed limit” by trial and error is also one of the reasons behind his success. Moreover, 
Wolf asserted that Alan Greenspan rejects “monetary targeting” because the relationship 
between money and spending broke up in the 1980’s and early 1990’s.  
 
In 1996, the Fed Chairman warned of “Irrational Exuberance” and the idea of bubbles in 
the economy. Greenspan argued that it is impossible to know whether a bubble is 
occurring and that the right solution resides in a flexible economy.
55 
 
A concern about Greenspan’s approach to asset price bubbles is that the Fed was 
indifferent when prices were going up and intervened in an aggressive way when they 
were falling. According to Wolf, this policy encouraged investors to take excessive risks. 
He asserted that Greenspan or the Fed should have warned people of the risks they incur 
in excessive speculation, “rather than act as a cheerleader for U.S. productivity”. In fact 
during the Dotcom bubble, Greenspan believed that increasing share prices was a sign of 
confidence in the growth of American corporations.
56 
 
Finally, according to Martin Wolf, three lessons should be drawn from the Greenspan 
era: The first is that it is hard for a central bank, especially the Fed as it is the most 
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important of all, to decide on its monetary policy as it is hard to have a clear 
understanding of what’s clearly going on in an economy, especially in asset prices.
57 This 
has been clearly demonstrated during the excessive speculation of investors from 1996 to 
2000 when no one believed that asset prices were overpriced and did not reflect at all 
their intrinsic values.  
 
The second is that “giving so much discretion to an institution dominated by one person 
is risky”
 58 In fact it is not until 1994 that the Fed moved towards more transparency and 
openness to the public. It is in 1994 that it began to reveal the FOMC directives after each 
FOMC meeting. It is also not until 1999, that it began to announce the “bias” toward 
which monetary policy was likely to go. Furthermore, it is not until 2002 that the Fed 
began to report to the press the vote on the federal funds rate target during the FOMC 
meetings.  
 
Finally, transparency matters. It is not until 2004 that the Fed began to release the 
minutes of the FOMC meeting after 3 weeks while it was 6 weeks before that date.
59 
Even today the Fed is not fully transparent as it does not publish its forecast of the 





Clearly, the U.S. economy relies a great deal on the movements of interest rates.  The 
Federal Reserve, responsible for the manipulation of national interest rates, must analyze 
the current state of the economy and make adjustments that will lead to stable growth and 
consumer confidence in the nation’s financial health.  However, as the post 9/11 actions 
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of the Fed show, excessive low interest can fuel too much spending, high consumer debt, 
low savings, and now combined with a declining dollar and the sub-prime crisis, have a 
serious consequence—namely stagflation.
61  Factors indicating decline include high oil 
prices, rising healthcare costs, lingering fears of terrorism, and an increasing government 
debt that leaves too much of America’s fate in foreign hands.
62  
 
Overall, the Federal Reserve did a good job of sustaining the U.S. economy after 9/11. 
Indeed, the purpose of the Federal Reserve is not necessarily to prevent cyclical 
downturns, but to shield the U.S. economy from sinking too far into the depths of cycles 
or, conversely, overheating to the point of excessive inflation.  The Federal Reserve can 
also not be blamed for the escalating trade deficit that the federal government accrues by 
pursuing foreign military operations—it simply must take that into account when fine-
tuning the economy. Perhaps more important than measured steps to preserve the U.S. 
economy would be to end the growing deficits and create a sense of balance in budgetary 
and trade matters.  In the end, the Federal Reserve’s actions on interest rates have both 
positive and negative effects—both micro- and macro- issues must be included when 
formulating policy in order to achieve success in the U.S. economy. 
 
The Fed is one of the most prestigious institutions in the world. In fact it is not by pure 
accident that after the terrorist attack on the world trade center in September 2001, an 
institution like the Fed, within few hours of the attack, can make the following 
announcement: “The Federal Reserve System is open and operating”
.63  
 
This message of the Fed to the financial system as a whole was clear: “We are here” and 
has directly been translated into real actions. The Fed provided $45 billion to banks 
through the discount window; two hundred times more than the amount provided the 
week before. The terrorist attacks of September 11
th, 2001 on New York City and 
Washington D.C. were immediately detrimental to the U.S. economy.  For example, 
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when the New York Stock Exchange reopened on September 17
th, the market fell 684.81 
points, and by September 21
st had fallen to a level of 8,235.81, compared to 9,605.51 a 
mere eleven days earlier on September 10
th.
64  In New York City alone, physical, 
economic, and psychological damage estimates range into the hundreds of billions. The 
tragic loss of life left an indelible mark on American society, and the new psychological 
vulnerability of the nation’s financial heart left consumers and producers alike uncertain 
of both the near and long term future.  The “[American] economy’s success is tied to 
confidence,”
65 so consequently the Federal Reserve acted to eliminate uncertainty and 
create a new sense of confidence in the economy’s psyche. 
 
In the days following the terrorist attacks, the Federal Reserve injected $45 billion in 
emergency funds into the economy.
66  The logic behind this was to counteract the natural 
fear of spending consumers and businesses would exhibit after a destructive shock to the 
economy.  For example, despite “patriotic buying” the stock market still plummeted as 
investors sold on airlines, New York based corporations, and other firms affected by the 
attacks, as evidenced above.  As confidence decreased, Greenspan and the Fed decided to 
slash already falling interest rates.  Before the terrorist attacks, the Fed had already cut 
interest rates seven times during 2001 in response to the earlier bursting of the Internet 
bubble and various other factors.  On October 3
rd, the Fed cut benchmark interest rates 
one-half percent for the second time since the attack, down to a level of 2.5%, the lowest 




th, the Fed cut the rates yet again to a level of 1.75%, for a grand total of 
eleven cuts and a 4.75 point drop in interest rates for the entire year.
68  These moves were 
“intended to reduce borrowing costs across the economy, helping to stimulate more 
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economic activity among consumers and businesses,” and banks responded by cutting 
their lending rates at the same rate as the Fed did with each respective cut.
69 
  
The official recession of the American economy had actually began in March 2001 and 
lasted only one quarter—the fourth quarter of 2001 (after the terrorist attacks) actually 
displayed a 1.4% growth rate.
70 Clearly, the dramatic decrease of interest rates did serve 
to inspire spending in a time of confusion, and also allowed Congress and the President to 
agree on a federal recovery package for the future.  Indeed, by early 2002 experts 
heralded the onset of economic recovery.  However, interest rates continued to plummet 
up through 2004—down to an absolute low of 1%.  While this is a tactic meant to keep 
spending up, there are negatives worth mentioning.  Savings accounts, especially for 
retirees and baby boomers, returned very little.  Consumers accumulated a high debt on 
credit cards and mortgages, and the federal government became more reliant on foreign 
capital because of a growing trade and budget deficit.  Only in late 2004 did the Fed 
begin to raise interest rates again, up to 2.25% by the end of that year.
71  Raising interest 
rates increases savings returns but also premiums on mortgage, loan, and credit 
payments.  
Greenspan’s Fed was to hold rates at 1 per cent from 2003 to June 2004, long after the 
dotcom bubble was over. It is clear that monetary policy was too accommodative. Rates 
of 1 per cent were bound to encourage all kinds of risky behaviour. Greenspan's book
72 
tried to clear his name by blaming the bubble on an Asian savings glut, which 
purportedly created stimulus beyond the control of the Fed by driving down global bond 
rates. 
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The Federal Reserve and Greenspan's
73 leadership of it does bear part of the blame for the 
subprime collapse and the wider damage to which it has led. As is becoming ever more 
apparent, many of the lending practices in the mortgage market during these years, 
especially in the subprime market, involved carelessness, deception, or both. Many 
people borrowed who had no prospect of servicing the loans they took out; they were 
hoping either to resell the house at a higher price, or to refinance it and draw on the 
appreciated value to make their payments. Some borrowers were apparently induced to 
buy houses they could not afford, or to take out loans they should not have been granted, 
by irresponsible brokers and other agents keen to make commissions on transactions 
despite knowing they were inappropriate. 
 
Many of the banks that packaged these loans into securities also put them into complex 
investment "vehicles" that they did not understand, and sold them to investors who 
understood even less about them. The credit rating agencies, on which investors normally 
rely to inform them of such risks, were at best useless. Today the wreckage, consisting of 
abandoned houses, defaulted loans, displaced homeowners, banks making good on the 
billions of dollars of losses they had guaranteed, and uninsured investors marking down 
their portfolios, can be seen everywhere. With respect to the housing bubble, the Fed 
asserts its innocence. It says that monetary policy was appropriate. It also takes the 
position that while, ex post, it is clear that supervision and regulation was too lax, no one 
saw the housing and credit bubble forming.  
 
Consequently, they cannot be blamed. The assertion that the stance of monetary policy 
was appropriate given the measured inflation rate just assumes away the problem. If 
policy contributed to the bubble, then it was inappropriate regardless of the inflation rate. 
Contrary to the Fed position, people did see the housing and credit bubbles forming, 
although they were in the minority. Most importantly, the Fed as the central bank and the 
principle banking regulator alone had the responsibility of forestalling systemic risks. 
Even if no one else saw the bubble forming, the Fed should have. Saying no one else saw 
                                                 




the crisis brewing is no defence. 
 
The Bernanke Monetary policy reaction to the financial crisis 
 
There are two aspects of a major financial crisis; firstly, a fast and deep fall in asset prices 
and, secondly, financial instability – a risk of a breakdown of the financial system due to 
bankruptcy of financial institutions of the systemic importance or disorganization of an 
important segments of the financial market. A general outcome is usually a credit crunch 
and economic stagnation or recession. It is widely accepted that central bank’s role is not 
to exert an impact on asset prices but to protect the financial system and the financial 
market from a systemic collapse and to prompt economic recovery. According to 
Mishkin and White “financial instability is the key problem facing the policymaker and 
not stock market crashes, even if they reflect the bursting of an asset price bubble. If the 
balance sheets of financial institutions are initially strong, then a stock market crash 
(bursting of a bubble) is unlikely to lead to financial instability. In this case, the effect of 
a stock market crash on the economy will operate through the usual wealth and cost of 
capital channels, only requiring the monetary policymakers to respond to the standard 
effects of stock market decline on aggregate demand.”
 74 
 
The problem is, however, that asset price bubbles are typically accompanied by excessive 
lending and leverage, risky investment and weak balance sheets of financial and non-
financial, debtor institutions.  
 
It is thus typical that bursting of an asset price bubble demands some involvement of the 
central bank beyond its commitment to maintain price stability or its intent to bar 
aggregate demand from falling. In such a juncture the central bank acts as a lender of last 
resort. Although this role of a central bank is essentially uncontroversial, during serious 
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crises it can be addressed towards many financial institutions, take huge amounts of bail-
out and become eventually a vast infusion of liquidity to the economy, without much 
respect to considerations other than avoiding the pending financial catastrophe. Such 
activity is certainly beyond monetary policymaker’s response to “the standard effects of 
stock market decline on aggregate demand.” Unfortunately, these efforts may not be very 
effective in promoting economic recovery, even when they take the form of quantitative 
easing, as in Japan.  
 
In ECB’s opinion
75 “one argument in favour of a policy of “leaning against the wind” is 
symmetry”. This is most welcome as a postulate but when it comes to a crisis it seems 
there is no much room for symmetry. Moreover, even when anti-bubble tightening of the 
monetary policy would be accepted in principle, the monetary policymaker may be 
reluctant to raise interest rates. “In any event, any asset price “misalignments” are 
difficult to identify and cannot be effectively resisted since that would require interest 
rate increases that would be destructive elsewhere in the economy. Conversely, any 
slowdown in economic activity associated with an asset price “bust” can be effectively 
resisted through an easing of monetary policy.  
 
This could impart a degree of asymmetry to the conduct of domestic monetary policy in 
the face of such disturbances.”
76 This quotation clearly presents why monetary policy 
tends to be asymmetric. We would only add and repeat that easing would rather not be 
very effective in promoting economic growth; the central bank, however, supplies 
abundant liquidity also for the reasons of financial stability. 
 
What might be longer-term results of such loosening of monetary policy? A good answer 
to this question is given by White
77 who claims that “lower interest rates can enhance 
“search for yield”. This will particularly be the case for financial institutions (like 
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insurance companies and defined benefit pension funds) that must hit predetermined 
hurdle rates. This both induces investors to purchase increasingly risky assets, and to use 
increased leverage to raise rates of return on equity. Such behaviour becomes manifest in 
reductions in risk premia on lower-rated paper and sovereigns, and on the increased 
availability of low cost finance to support venture capital investments and to purchase 
asset-backed securities. On the one hand, this encourages aggregate spending and 
investment as desired. On the other hand, should certain sectors be particularly 
favourably affected (...) this could set the scene for another burst of credit-fuelled 
misallocations further down the line.”  
 
It seems that the policy of the Fed provides a particularly good example of the mistakes a 
central bank can make with regard to financial crises. First of all, as presented in the 
second part of the paper, the Fed promoted hasty liberalization and gave up an effective 
supervision over financial institutions. Moreover, “Greenspan’s doctrine” which opposed 
any reaction to the build-up of asset price bubbles went hand in hand with big and lasting 
reductions of interest rates after a bubble has burst; for example, policy easing after the 
crisis of LTCM which fed the dot.com bubble.  The bursting of the bubble also made the 
Fed to lower its interest rates in the years 2001-2004 which can be considered as an 
important factor behind the build-up of imbalances unveiled during the present crisis. The 
policy was clearly asymmetric.  
 
When policy tightening eventually came it was rather abrupt and not justified in goods 
and services prices inflation. It seems that against the doctrine the policy reacted to asset 
price inflation and “irrational exuberance”. This however came too late such a policy 
shift could only “prick” a bubble. This was the case of policy tightening before March 
2000, when internet crisis began, and then when interest rate hikes started in the second 
half of 2004. All these mistakes were accompanied by strong moral hazard in big 





The way the present crisis is managed is based on liquidity injection on the scale not seen 
ever before. Only between August and November 2008 the Fed’s balance grew from 900 
billion US Dollars to 2.2 trillion US Dollars. Also in November 2008 the Fed announced 
new projects which are to boost the monetary base by another 800 billion US Dollars; the 
Fed decided to buy up to 100 billion US Dollars of debt directly issued by mortgage 
lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and 500 billion US Dollars of their mortgage-
backed securities (MBSs) and it created Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facilities 
(TALF) of 200 billion US Dollars which is to lend against a collateral of ABS (asset-
backed securities) backed by newly originated consumer and small business loans. In 
February 2009 the amount of TALF resources was increased to 1 trillion US Dollars. 
TALF is to realize the aims of Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) passed earlier last 
year by Congress – the money was, however, used mainly to bail-out troubled financial 
institutions. Press comments are not necessarily enthusiastic; “Under the guise of 
successive new programmes, each with a less memorable acronym than the last, the Fed 
is substituting its balance-sheet for that of the contracting private financial system to keep 
the American economy from being starved of credit.” “The MBS purchases are 
significant; for the first time they turn the Fed into a direct lender to consumers. Many 
homeowners, though they do not know it, will be sending their monthly mortgage 




th, 2009 the FED announced that it would purchase 300 billion US Dollars in 
Treasury debt (what is monetization of huge public deficits and raises questions about 
future independence of the FED), it would boost its purchases of MBSs to 1.25 trillion 
US Dollars from previously declared 500 billion US Dollars and it would buy 200 billion 
US Dollars of debt issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and not 100 billion US 
Dollars as announced in November 2008. In fact, it is difficult to follow new programmes 
which are to revive lending in the American economy; before this paper is presented 
there are possibly several new ones. These steps taken by the Fed are very 
unconventional central banking, to say the least; they are examples of quantitative easing 
                                                 





after nominal Fed funds rate has been cut virtually to zero. Money is for nothing, and the 
Fed is “pushing the string” now.  
 
Some other central banks are also eager to get credit flowing with the use of quantitative 
easing. The Bank of England announced on March 5
th, 2009 that it would buy 
government securities and private assets for 75 billion pounds (105 billion US Dollars).  
 
The present activities of the Fed and the American Treasury are aimed at absorbing 
troubled assets from the private financial sector, helping financial institutions to reduce 
their leverage, restoring confidence, reducing premia and yields and making credit flow 
again. To a degree they are successful – yields and premia have declined and there is 
more confidence. What concerns the “strategic” aims these activities do not seem to be 
very effective? Money is sticking in financial institutions instead of fuelling new lending 
and boosting the economy. “But precious little of (...) additional liquidity is finding its 
way through to households and corporate borrowers. In fact, most of it is now sloshing 
around the banking system like so much excess ballast. Banks have increased their 
reserve holdings on deposit with the Fed from $8 billion to $494 billion. This is $488 




The fact that this money remains idle may reflect an approach to the economy of 
households, firms and – eventually – financial institutions more realistic than that of the 
central bank. If the economy has been choked with cheap and too easily accessible credit 
it does not seem that even more credit is a solution. Of course, preventing the financial 
system from a collapse and viable firms from bankruptcy due to the credit crunch, 
although not without costs, is a reasonable policy. It is also true that negative market 
sentiment may be self-fulfilling. When most of the agents decide rightly to cut their 
excessive spending it reduces future incomes and – if we still believe in rational 
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expectations – make agents to economize even harder. This is a non-optimal Nash – and 
Keynes – equilibrium. It is thus advisable that the economic policy try to change these 
pessimistic sentiments. It may use fiscal instruments for that purpose and a reasonably 
easy monetary stance might help as well. Restrictive monetary policy would aggravate 
problems. With regard to the Great Depression this last statement is subject to Friedman-
Schwartz hypothesis which claims that the depression was so deep and long because 
monetary policy was not accommodative enough. Having said this we are still convinced 
that flooding the economy with money, bailing-out fraudulent and irresponsible financial 
institutions, their managers and stock-holders, keeping alive “zombie” firms and offering 
more credit to “ninja”(no income, no job, no assets) households is not the right policy. 
Hopefully, financial institutions and firms are now more cautious than some central 
bankers and hopefully they are afraid to lose more money even though it is virtually for 
nothing - but still to be repaid. One may expect, also households should realize their true 
creditworthiness.   
 
What is going to happen with this enormous amount of high-powered, idle money when 
the economic situation calms down? Is it going to fuel another “search for yield” and 
boost another bubble? Or probably in a changed environment it is going to spur goods 
and services inflation. In theory, this money could be also “mopped” back by the central 
bank. In practice, it is now difficult to imagine. This monetary hangover becomes a 
reason for anxiety which is also expressed in the press: “Having expanded its balance-
sheet so rapidly, the Fed may not have the foresight or courage to shrink it fast enough 







                                                 







The Fed is the most influential central bank – and possibly financial institution - in the 
world. However, its monetary policy remains discretionary, not fully transparent and 
concentrated in the hands of its chairman. The Chairman’s views and actions determine 
the monetary policy of the bank. This is particularly clear in the case of Greenspan’s 
tenure which is described with terms such as “Greenspan era” or “Greenspan’s doctrine”. 
Greenspan’s monetary policy was successful with respect to low inflation, economic 
growth and quick reaction to shocks, in particular 9/11. However, it refused to take the 
responsibility of financial stability comprehensively. In fact, it restricted itself only to 
reaction to any financial distress emerging. Moreover, the Fed used to continue lax 
monetary policy for too long, it thus fuelled next bubbles and any eventual change of its 
monetary policy stance was a bit of a pricking of a bubble. This policy was clearly 
asymmetric and not very consistent. In doing so the Fed boosted moral hazard, excessive 
and too risky investment and high indebtedness.  
 
The reaction of Bernanke’s Fed to the present financial crisis is canonical in terms of 
Greenspan’s doctrine. The main difference is that the scale of its accommodative steps is 
enormous even by previous standards. However it is difficult to dare run a novel policy 
during a major crisis, it is more and more clear that the Fed lacks intellectual courage to 
give up old mistakes and instead it tries even harder to run the same boom and bust 
policy.  
 
 
 
 